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The challenge for labor market policy in the transition economies has been to redress 
the sharp drops in employment and rises in unemployment in a way that fosters the 
creation of productive jobs. This paper first documents the magnitude and 
productivity of job and worker reallocation. It then investigates the effects of 
privatization, product and labor market liberalization, and obstacles to growth in the 
new private sector on reallocation and its productivity in Hungary, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine. We find that market reform has resulted in a large increase in the pace of 
job reallocation, particularly that occurring between sectors and via firm turnover. 
Unlike under central planning, the job reallocation during the transition has 
contributed significantly to aggregate productivity growth. Privatization has not only 
stimulated intrasectoral job reallocation, but the reallocation is more productive than 
that among remaining state firms. The effect of privatization on firm productivity 
varies considerably across countries and is not always positive. The productivity gains 
from privatization have generally not come at the expense of workers, but are rather 
associated with increased wages and employment. 
   3
INTRODUCTION 
The planned economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union began 
the transition around 1990 with very high employment rates and negligible open 
unemployment.  But productive jobs were scarce.  Many workers and firms found 
themselves producing goods and services whose demand plummeted once planning 
was relaxed and markets were liberalized.  These unproductive jobs were not only 
associated with unwanted and low value output, but they also carried falling real 
wages, increased insecurity, and low job satisfaction for workers.  At the same time, 
sectors where demand appeared and grew rapidly – such as consumer goods, trade, 
and services – were underdeveloped and faced obstacles to growth, so potentially 
productive jobs proved to be difficult to create.  The challenge for labor market policy 
in the transition economies, therefore, has been not merely to redress the sharp drops 
in employment and rises in unemployment, but to do so in a way that fosters the 
creation of productive jobs. 
This paper addresses the challenge of creating productive jobs by 
decomposing the problem into two equally crucial parts.  The first concerns the 
dynamics of labor reallocation across firms – worker flows, the processes of job 
destruction and job creation, and their relationships with relative productivity.   
Although the aggregate statistics show large employment declines in virtually all 
countries, have the declines tended to be concentrated in the least productive sectors 
and firms, so that there has been “creative destruction”?  Have the new jobs been 
created where productivity is relatively high, so that the overall shifts of employment 
are in a direction that is productivity-enhancing?  The paper, therefore, documents not 
only the magnitudes of job and worker reallocation, but also permits an evaluation of 
the degree to which the result has been creation of productive jobs. 
While the first part of the analysis concerns the flows of workers and jobs 
across firms, the second focuses on increasing the productivity of jobs within firms. 
The productivity of firms within sectors differed widely at the beginning of the 
transition, because the market mechanisms which force unproductive firms to 
downsize and exit in market economies and allow entrepreneurs to establish more 
productive firms were absent.  A variety of types of restructuring within firms such as 
changes in product mix, organizational structure, and technological improvements can   4
make the jobs workers already have more productive.  These improvements could 
allow firms not only to raise the quality of existing jobs, but to create new ones as 
well.  
A theme running through both parts of the analysis is the extent to which 
market reforms have facilitated productive job creation.  Because the main concern of 
the paper is firm-level evidence, the focus is on policies that have affected firms:  
privatization, product and labor market liberalization, and obstacles to growth, 
particularly in the new private sector.
1  Have these policies helped create more 
productive jobs through between- and within-sector job reallocation, worker flows, 
and within-firm productivity growth?  The evidence on these questions comes from 
studies employing firm-level data in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.  Most 
of the data, and therefore most of the evidence, pertain to manufacturing, particularly 
large and medium-size firms inherited from the planning system.  These data are 
comprehensive in coverage, but they contain relatively few labor market variables 
(principally, employment and wages) for each firm.  The analysis is therefore 
supplemented by survey data, in Russia based on a stratified probability sample of 
manufacturing firms and in Romania based on a sample of micro and small 
enterprises in all sectors. 
The main messages from a review of available evidence are as follows.   
Market reform has resulted in a very large increase in the pace of job reallocation.  
This was mainly in the form of job destruction in the manufacturing sector during the 
early years of reform, but job creation has also increased in recent years as the 
economies recovered.  The depth of the reallocation process is signified by a 
relatively large proportion of job reallocation occurring between sectors (compared 
with OECD economies, see the summary in Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999).  But the 
pace has also been fast and increasing among firms within the same narrow sectors. 
Firms appear to have changed their employment levels primarily, however, by 
adjusting separations rather than hiring rates.  Over the course of the transition period, 
job reallocation became a much larger proportion of worker turnover, again indicating 
that the flurry of labor market activity involved significant restructuring.  Firm 
turnover has sharply increased from very low levels, and entry and exit are now 
important contributors to job creation and destruction, respectively. 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, labor market policies geared to unemployed workers are not addressed in this 
paper.   5
Firm and environmental characteristics, including those affected by public 
policies, have influenced job and worker flow rates.  Product market competition has 
increased excess job reallocation and churning (replaced separations).  Job destruction 
has been lower in labor markets where employment is concentrated among a few 
dominant firms, perhaps due to stronger political pressure to maintain employment in 
those areas.  Higher unionization is associated with reduced quits.  New and small 
firms have been particularly active job creators and destroyers, while reorganized 
firms have experienced high churning. 
Unlike under central planning, job reallocation during the transition has 
contributed significantly to aggregate productivity growth. Jobs have been reallocated 
from less to more productive incumbent firms, and the exiting firms have been 
predominantly less productive ones. Though entering firms have not initially been 
more productive than incumbents, the surviving ones have caught or surpassed 
incumbents within three years.  
Privatization has affected labor markets, leading to greater excess job 
reallocation in both Russia and Ukraine. Privatized firms with domestic owners have 
created more jobs in Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine and destroyed more in Russia. 
Concentrated outside ownership has not led to higher job or worker flows. Firms with 
foreign blockholders actually experienced less job reallocation and worker churning.  
Not only has privatization increased job reallocation among firms within the 
same narrow sectors, but privatized firms’ reallocation has been more productive than 
that of state firms: privatized firms’ employment change decisions have been more 
strongly related to their relative productivity within their sector. 
Firm productivity has usually improved as a result of privatization, but the 
magnitude and timing of the effect has varied considerably across countries and types 
of privatization.  Privatization to foreign owners has consistently led to large 
productivity increases within a year after privatization.  The effects of domestic 
privatization have varied considerably across countries, however.  In Romania and 
Hungary, strong positive effects already appeared in the year of privatization, whereas 
the effect was negative until five years after privatization in Russia.  The effect was 
also weak in Ukraine.  We find little support for a number of plausible hypotheses for 
why the privatization effect might differ across countries. 
The available evidence is mixed on whether the productivity gains from 
privatization have come at the expense of workers.  Foreign privatizations, which   6
were most productive on average, have generally had a positive effect on employment 
and wages.  Domestic privatizations, however, have had a negative effect on wages, 
even in Hungary and Romania where post-privatization productivity gains were 
substantial.  Privatization has also increased inequality.  White-collar workers have 
benefited more from privatization than blue-collar workers, both in terms of 
employment and wages, especially in foreign-owned firms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II.1 discusses the main 
questions to be addressed in more depth.  The data are described in section II.2. 
Section II.3 displays the results on job and worker flows, their relationships with firm 
and environmental characteristics, their productivity consequences, and the effects of 
privatization on productivity and workers.  Section III concludes with a discussion of 
policy implications of these results.  
II.  FINDINGS 
II.1 Main Questions 
II.1.1 Job and Worker Flows 
How do firms’ adjustments to changes in the environment vary with economic 
policy and the institutional environment? The Soviet system of governing enterprises 
was very different from that in a market economy. Most business decision variables, 
including output, product variety, prices, technology, wages, and investment levels, 
were either specifically planned or indirectly controlled. Incentives to meet planned 
output targets were much higher than those to contain costs, innovate, and produce 
goods of value. There was no effective domestic or import competition, private 
ownership, entry, or exit. So the usual factors thought to influence business decisions 
were largely absent. 
  Worker mobility was restricted by a number of practices, and enterprises had 
little discretion in their employment decisions. There were constraints on the ability to 
fire workers. Soft budget constraints, planned output targets, and unreliable input 
supplies combined to produce continual excess demand for labor and other inputs 
(Kornai, 1992).  
  Factors affecting restructuring behavior during the transition should be quite 
different. Liberalization permits enterprises, even those remaining in state ownership,   7
to make most decisions autonomously. The extent to which firms actually adjust in 
response to changes in their environment is likely to be a function of strength of 
competitive pressures, the objectives of the owners, the effectiveness of the owners’ 
corporate governance, and information conveyed by prices and wages. These factors 
are influenced by the specific design of policies of liberalization, privatization, 
stabilization, and others (e.g., policies concerning layoffs and unemployment). 
  The restructuring will be studied along several different dimensions. The first 
is the magnitude of job flows. Have they increased in response to reform? The rates 
can tell us about the amount of restructuring going on, as well as provide a measure of 
the flexibility of the labor market.   
Are the observed employment changes temporary or permanent? If of a 
permanent nature, then the restructuring should have more long-lasting effects on the 
economy. 
The synchronization of job creation and destruction will be analyzed. If job 
creation and destruction both rose at the same time, then the effects on the size of the 
manufacturing sector, flows to other sectors, unemployment, and out of the labor 
force will be less than if one rose before the other. The analysis will also shed light on 
whether it takes different lengths of time for reform to influence destruction vs. 
creation. 
The next task is to measure the extent to which excess job reallocation (the 
reallocation above that necessary to achieve a certain net employment change in the 
manufacturing sector) has occurred within narrow sectors vs. across sectors. These 
types of reallocation have important, but different functions. Between-sector 
reallocation can bring resources in alignment with relative demand across sectors. 
Within-sector reallocation can move resources to more productive firms within the 
sector, raising the overall efficiency of the sector. The relative sizes of sectors were 
likely to have been far out of alignment with relative market demand on the eve of 
transition, so one might expect to see some sectors gain employment and others 
decline (between-sector reallocation). There should have been considerable scope for 
within-sector reallocation as well, though, as planners may not have allocated 
resources among enterprises within sectors in perfect alignment with differences in 
productivity and market opportunities. And market economies are characterized by a 
high proportion of excess job reallocation within sectors, so if the reforms cause these   8
economies to function more like market economies, one might expect to see a higher 
proportion of within-sector reallocation than before.  
  During the Soviet period enterprise entry occurred only when planners 
decided to expand a sector where the existing enterprises had reached economies of 
scale.  There were no entrepreneurs starting new firms because they thought they 
could introduce a new product to the market or produce an existing one more 
efficiently. Exit was an even rarer occurrence, as planners did not wish to admit 
failure. As a result, resources were often locked in inefficient enterprises.  
New entry is considered to be a crucial source of jobs in transition economies. 
Most old firms need to downsize, but they may be pressured not to if new jobs aren’t 
available. Exit of less productive firms is beneficial for overall productivity, but 
workers bear particularly large costs, since exit involves large layoffs in particular 
locations. We study how the contributions of entry and exit to job creation and 
destruction, respectively, have changed during the transition. 
A firm could reduce its employment level by raising its separation rate, 
lowering its hiring rate (i.e., through attrition), or a combination of both. Though the 
net employment rate is the same in either case, worker turnover both in this and other 
firms will be higher if the firm cuts employment mainly by raising the separation 
rate.
2 High worker turnover may or may not be good for the economy. On one hand, it 
is costly for workers and their employers (e.g., training costs, hiring costs, and 
moving costs). But it has the potential to increase match quality between the employer 
and employee. State labor market policies such as mandatory severance pay can 
influence which method firms use to change their employment levels.
3 We will 
analyze worker flows with this in mind. 
Worker flows may be thought to be more beneficial for the economy if they 
are associated with job flows. If a person quits because he would like a change of 
scenery, that imposes costs on the new employer to train him and on the old employer 
to recruit and train a replacement. The productivity of the new match may not be 
higher than the previous one. In contrast, if the separation is due to lack of demand for 
the firm’s product and is thus not replaced, and the worker moves to a newly created 
job where demand is greater, that is a more economically useful worker flow. We thus 
                                                 
2 This also raises worker turnover for other firms. Hires coming directly from other jobs create 
vacancies that need to be filled (a vacancy chain). 
3 Mandatory severance pay raises the attractiveness of a hiring freeze relative to layoffs.    9
measure the proportion of worker flows made up by job flows and how it has changed 
during the transition.  
If increased labor market flexibility is a desirable goal, then it would be useful 
to know what firm and environmental characteristics influence job and worker flow 
rates. One might expect more reallocation within competitive sectors, as more 
productive firms take market share away from the less productive ones. More 
dispersed sectors also provide more alternative job opportunities for workers in the 
sector, so churning may also be higher.  
Political pressure to maintain employment may be more intense in labor 
markets dominated by a few large employers, as workers have fewer outside 
opportunities. Workers are also less likely to quit in such markets. 
Unions may work to prevent firms from cutting employment. Alternatively, 
they could try to keep the firm from replacing incumbent workers with ones the firm 
may feel are better matches. Unions could also provide workers with a mechanism to 
influence firm policy. Workers who feel they have been heard by management may 
feel greater attachment to the firm, reducing quits. 
New firms may not know their optimal size upon entry, so they could require 
further adjustments over time. It can also take time to recruit all the workers necessary 
to achieve the optimal size. So job flows are likely to be higher in new firms. 
Churning flows may be higher as well: since new firms have less information about 
match quality, they might need to replace more of their workers. 
If a firm has been reorganized through a split-up or spin-off, some of its 
previous functional units may have gone with the other part(s) of the former firm. A 
new mix of skills may therefore be required, leading to job creation or churning. If a 
merger or acquisition took place, redundancies may have been created, leading to job 
destruction. Hence, reorganized firms are likely to experience high job and worker 
flow rates.   
Workers in larger firms tend to receive more firm-specific training, since they 
can more easily build a career by advancing in the internal hierarchy. This raises 
adjustment costs in large firms compared to small firms. As a result, large firms are 
likely to be slower to adjust employment levels and work harder to keep workers from 
quitting. 
Given the need for most old firms to shed labor, it is especially important that 
new firms create jobs to keep unemployment down.  There are numerous potential   10
constraints on their growth, however.  Entrepreneurs could lack the knowledge of how 
to write a business plan, be successful at obtaining financing, and run a successful 
business.  Even with knowledge of how to obtain it, entrepreneurs may lack access to 
financing due to market imperfections.  High taxes could limit the scope for internal 
financing of growth.  The necessary managerial or employee human capital could be 
in short supply.  And state bureaucrats could hinder growth by extracting bribes rather 
than protecting property rights and enforcing contracts.  Evidence from a special 
survey will be employed to determine which of these factors are most important for 
growth.  
Has the economy received any productivity benefit from the destruction, or 
has the worker dislocation been all pain and no gain? Many cases of direct 
subsidization and other forms of support for weak and failing enterprises are known to 
have occurred, while discriminatory taxes, bureaucratic interference, poor contract 
enforcement, and uncertain property rights protection have impeded those that are 
more successful (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Aslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996).  
Russia and Ukraine could thus be subject to “sclerosis” (Caballero and Hammour, 
2000), in which less productive resources remain employed due to market 
imperfections and government policies, while the creation of more productive 
matches of resources and enterprises is impeded.  Alternatively, less productive firms 
may have been pressured by competition and profit-seeking private owners to 
downsize, while more productive firms seized new profit-making opportunities and 
created jobs in the process. Such a scenario would positively contribute to aggregate 
productivity growth. Not only does the answer to this question affect productivity 
growth during the transition, but it is also important for future growth prospects. 
Productive firms should be able to respond more quickly to the recovery in demand, 
as well as be in a better position to compete in world markets, so future growth 
prospects will be brighter if more resources are concentrated among the most 
productive firms. 
The productivity effects of firm turnover are of particular importance. Exit 
tends to be more costly to workers than job destruction in continuing firms – the 
concentrated nature of the destruction can make finding a new job even harder. So if 
firm turnover isn’t productive, that would be even worse for the economy than 
destructive continuing firm job flows. Productivity growth from firm turnover is not 
guaranteed. New entrants may lack the political connections and financing needed to   11
compete successfully, so even the potentially productive ones may be short-lived.  
Exit may not be productive if survival depends more on political connections than 
relative efficiency. For example, the state may protect less productive incumbent 
firms from exiting, particularly when they are dominant employers in the region. The 
analysis investigates whether new entrants are actually more productive than 
incumbents, as is often assumed but seldom checked.  Even if new entrants are not as 
productive as incumbents initially, they could learn how to be productive with time, 
provided they survive that long.  This suggests a test for learning effects among 
surviving entrants. The analysis also examines whether exiting firms tend to be more 
or less productive than survivors, as well as measures the overall contributions of 
entry and exit to productivity growth. 
 
II.1.2 Privatization 
Has privatization improved firm productivity? Has the effect been universal 
across countries and different types of firms, or has the effect varied according to such 
factors as privatization design and institutional environment?  There are reasons to 
believe that each matters.  
Starting with privatization policy design, the implications are quite 
controversial.  Privatization through transfers to employees has been common in 
transition economies, due to relative ease of administrative and political 
implementation, and it is possible that employee ownership may improve work 
incentives, company loyalty, and support for restructuring.
4  Widely dispersed 
ownership among employees may facilitate takeovers by outsiders (Earle and Estrin, 
1996), and there is some anecdotal evidence that this evolution is taking place in a 
number of transition economies.  On the other hand, insider privatization is frequently 
alleged to be ill-suited to the restructuring demands of the transition.
5  Employees 
may lack the necessary skills, capital, access to markets and technologies necessary to 
turn their firms around, and corporate governance by employees may function 
                                                 
4 For evidence on the productivity effects of worker ownership in the West, see Estrin, Jones, and 
Svejnar (1987) and Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993). 
5 Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) and Lipton and Sachs (1990), for instance, argue against 
privatization to employees, while Ellerman (1993), Stiglitz (1999) and Weitzman (1993) argue in favor.  
Earle and Estrin (1996) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of worker and manager ownership in 
the transition setting.   12
particularly poorly when the firm requires difficult restructuring choices involving 
disparate distributional impacts within the firm.
6 
Mass privatization programs, typically involving vouchers distributed to 
citizens, have also accounted for a substantial share of privatization in many transition 
countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, and several Central Asian economies).  The intention of these programs is to 
increase the speed of privatization by overcoming the problems of insufficient 
demand due to low domestic savings and reluctance of foreign investors, and if 
possible to jump-start domestic equity markets with a rapid release of shares (e.g., 
Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Earle, Frydman, and Rapaczynski, 1993a; Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1994).  In principle, such programs may avoid high levels of inside 
ownership, but in Russia and Ukraine they were in fact combined with strong 
preferences for employees to use their vouchers in acquiring shares in their employer.   
A serious problem with the programs is the risk of highly dispersed ownership 
structures, a problem normally addressed through the creation of intermediaries – 
either by the state as part of the program (e.g., in Poland and Romania), or by private 
parties competing for individuals' vouchers (e.g., in the Czech Republic, Russia, and 
Slovakia).  Although there has been rather little empirical evidence on the effects of 
these programs, a number of authors have been highly critical of them.
7 
The final major privatization method, case-by-case sales of large blocks of 
shares to outside investors, is the method used most often in the West and to many 
observers would appear to be the most likely to encourage productivity-enhancing 
restructuring.  The disadvantages of sales are related to insufficient demand and 
political difficulties compounded by problems of valuation.
8  In addition, it has 
frequently been the case that sales contracts include not only a price, but also 
commitments regarding investment and employment, which are taken into account in 
                                                 
6 See Hansmann (1990) for this argument in explaining the patterns of worker ownership in Western 
economies.  The institutional form of employee ownership, including voting and share trading 
practices, may also have implications for firm performance (Earle and Estrin, 1996; Earle and Telegdy, 
2002). 
7 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1999); Black, Kraakman and Tarrassova (2000); Kornai (2000); Spicer, 
McDermott, and Kogut (2000); and Roland (2001).  Proponents of such programs include Lipton and 
Sachs (1990), Blanchard et al. (1993), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), and Boycko, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1995).  
8 These difficulties probably explain why only three transition countries – Eastern Germany, Hungary, 
and Estonia, each of which had clear advantages in selling to outsiders – were the only ones to adopt 
sales as the principal privatization method, although the pace was criticized even in these three 
countries.   13
selecting a buyer.
9  Although policymakers may feel themselves politically 
constrained to ensure continued employment and operation of privatized firms, such 
restrictions could have reduced restructuring in the companies privatized through 
block sales, attenuating any potential benefits of privatization. 
Among the recipients of blocks of shares through sales, it may be important to 
distinguish foreign from domestic investors.  Most observers would probably agree 
that foreign owners are likely to have better access to finance, management skills, 
new technologies, and knowledge of markets (e.g., Kogut, 1996), which would 
suggest a higher productivity effect when privatization results in foreign ownership.  
On the other hand, foreigners may face special difficulties restructuring firms in 
transition economies, where layoff decisions are highly politicized, for example, and 
where local networks and knowledge of local conditions may be unusually 
nontransparent.  Under such conditions, any advantage of foreign ownership in raising 
productivity may be reduced, and foreigners might even do worse than well-selected 
domestic investors. 
The implications of the policy design for the relative effectiveness of 
privatization in raising productivity across countries depend on how one evaluates 
these divergent arguments.  If privatization works most effectively when the new 
owners are concentrated outside investors, and even more so when they are foreign 
investors, then we would expect the strongest impact on enterprise productivity the 
closer the program comes to producing such ownership structures, i.e., in Hungary.
10  
In order of the importance of concentrated outsiders and foreign investors, the effect 
of privatization would be second largest in Romania, followed by Russia and Ukraine.  
If instead, however, insiders are the most effective at restructuring and running their 
companies, or if it is the case that an initial privatization to dispersed outsiders might 
lead to a better ultimate selection of a controlling owner than would have resulted 
from an initial sale of a controlling block, then the implications could be different, 
possibly even suggesting that the magnitude of the effect could decline across the four 
countries in inverse alphabetical order:  Ukraine, Russia, Romania, and Hungary. 
Even if the relative magnitudes of the privatization effects are not reversed, 
the consequences of different privatization methods might manifest themselves 
differently over time.   For example, if concentrated private ownership is necessary to 
                                                 
9 See Negrescu (2000) for a discussion of these provisions in Romanian sales contracts. 
10 The results we review below are primarily from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.   14
achieve restructuring, then one would expect to see more immediate effects from sales 
to concentrated outsiders than from voucher or insider privatization, where it takes 
time for concentrated blocks to form.  In this case, the major differences across 
countries could arise in the timing of the potential benefits from privatization.  A 
possible hypothesis would be that the speed of the impact of privatization falls 
alphabetically, as the initial ownership concentration is increasing in the fraction of 
sales in all privatization transactions.  The subsequent dynamics of the privatization 
effect reflect the possibilities for secondary trading leading to increased concentration, 
however, and countries with high initial levels of inside and dispersed outside 
ownership initially may tend to catch up so that the final impact after several years is 
not very different across countries. 
Turning to the business and policy environment, a natural hypothesis is that 
privatization works best in a business environment that protects the property rights 
and enforces the contracts that private owners require to ensure a return on their 
investment and effort (Anderson, Lee, and Murrell, 2000; Black, Kraakman, and 
Tarrasova, 2000).  In this case, countries with better institutional ratings should also 
have the strongest privatization effects.  Conditional on institutional ratings made by 
international organizations, the size of the privatization effect should decline in 
alphabetical order among our four countries.
11  An alternative view of the business 
and policy environment might be that ownership matters least when the environment 
functions well, as regulation, competition, and hard budget constraints serve to 
discipline firm behavior.  From that point of view, the institutional environment could 
be a substitute rather than a complement for private ownership.
12 
The quality of the institutional environment may also affect the dynamics of 
the privatization effect.  For example, if better institutions result in faster development 
of financial markets that facilitate ownership reallocation and concentration, then a 
country with a relatively poor initial ownership structure but good institutions may 
tend to start off with a low privatization effect but then catch up over time.  If we 
adopt the conventional assumption that concentrated outside ownership is the most 
likely to deliver productivity improvements, however, then our data do not contain 
                                                 
11 These are documented in Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a). 
12 A related argument is that concentrated ownership is more effective when legal protections are 
weaker; see LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999).  Brown and Earle (2001) investigate the 
complementarity or substitutability of private ownership with the competitiveness of product markets 
and with the privatization of competitors.   15
examples of countries with poor ownership but good institutions and vice versa (the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia might be more instructive in this 
regard).  Among our four countries, where (again under the conventional ownership 
assumption) the quality of privatization and the quality of institutions are positively 
correlated, these arguments imply that the initial differential privatization effect may 
not wear off so quickly, as the same countries that start with greater ownership 
concentration also have the best chances for further productivity-enhancing ownership 
reallocation. 
Yet another possibility would be that the nature of the privatization policy 
design and the quality of the institutional environment have offsetting effects.  For 
example, it might be the case that private ownership is generally most effective in a 
poor institutional environment but that concentrated outside investors tend to have the 
strongest effect on productivity in all types of environments.  Or perhaps the reverse 
is true, or perhaps the factors interact; for instance, inside ownership might be 
relatively efficacious in a poor environment and outside ownership might be superior 
when institutions function well.  In any of these situations, the predicted cross-country 
ranking of the coefficient magnitudes becomes ambiguous.  How the effects of 
privatization vary is ultimately of course an empirical question, one on which our 
results may be able to provide some evidence. 
How has privatization affected workers? Have the effects varied across 
privatization methods? Workers often opposed privatization, because they feared that 
new private owners, particularly foreigners, would increase profitability through mass 
layoffs and wage cuts (see, e.g., Aghion and Blanchard (1998)). On the other hand, 
privatized firms could engage more vigorously in the restructuring necessary for 
survival and growth, leading to higher employment and wages than in firms 
remaining in state control. 
The objectives of different types of private owners vis-à-vis employment 
policy are likely to vary. Workers are presumably interested in keeping their jobs and 
receiving the highest wage they can, and ownership may give workers additional 
influence to block employment and wage reductions.  Workers may also be more 
reluctant to leave a job in a firm where they have influence in exchange for a job in 
one where they do not.  Managers are usually assumed to have a preference for 
managing larger firms, as size raises their status.  The effect of increasing managerial 
ownership is ambiguous – more control rights could help managers to achieve their   16
status objective, but higher cash flow rights could instead align the manager’s 
incentives with profit maximization, which may be inconsistent with the size goal. 
Outside owners are usually assumed to maximize profit.
13  Depending on the 
circumstances in the firm, profit maximization could be associated with either high or 
low flows.  Workers may feel less certain about the future direction of the firm when 
it is outsider-owned, so they may be more apt to search for other employment 
opportunities.  Outsiders may also have a desire to replace workers with people of 
their own choosing.   So compared to the state and possibly to insiders, one would 
expect higher flows on average. 
It may matter whether the outside owners are dispersed individuals or 
concentrated legal entities or foreign investors.  The concentrated groups are more 
likely to be able to exert control.  If the outsiders do not exert control, then insiders 
will be free to pursue their employment preservation objective, which will not be 
tempered by their own ownership.  In such a scenario, flows may be lower than under 
insider ownership.  But if the outsider owners are concentrated, profit-maximizing 
objectives should dominate.  Foreign owners could have an additional effect, either by 
scaring off xenophobic workers (increasing turnover), or by retaining more of them 
because workers anticipate that foreign-owned firms will have better prospects. 
The variation in effects on workers could also be related to the nature of 
productivity gains from privatization. If productivity gains are results of strategic 
restructuring (e.g., the introduction of new technologies, products, or organizational 
improvements), the firm could become more competitive and expand its market share, 
leading to employment and wage growth.  If, however, the restructuring is defensive 
(reductions in hoarding of labor and other inputs), then employment and wages are 
likely to fall.
14  It is not clear what the effects of defensive vs. strategic restructuring 
will be on worker churning.  Strategic restructuring could require a different skill mix, 
resulting in more churning.  But this restructuring could make the firm more viable, 
and thus a more attractive employer, reducing quits.   
Some owners are likely to be more capable of strategic restructuring (e.g., 
foreigners) than others. So the differences in effects on workers are likely to be 
                                                 
13 Legal entities may wish to siphon off profits ("tunnelling," in the mot de jour) from the firm of study 
to their own firm, but even then the legal entity should wish to minimize personnel costs.  
14 See Grosfeld and Roland (1996) for a discussion of defensive vs. strategic restructuring.   17
related to both the capability of the owner to exert influence on firm policy and the 
type of restructuring it can implement once gaining control.  
 
II.2 Data 
For the job flow and productivity of job flow analysis, the paper uses annual 
industrial registries provided by the State Committees for Statistics in Russia (the 
Goskomstat) and Ukraine (the Derzhkomstat).  In Soviet Russia, the data include the 
universe of civilian industrial enterprises, while after 1991 the coverage is supposed 
to be all industrial firms with more than 100 employees plus those that are more than 
25 percent owned by the state and/or by legal entities that are themselves included in 
the registry.  The firms in the Russian registry accounted for 90.5 percent of officially 
reported total industrial employment in 1992, while the Ukrainian registry covered 
94.1 percent.  The coverage rate in relation to official employment declined somewhat 
thereafter, falling by the year 2000 to 69.8 percent in Russia and 85.2 percent in 
Ukraine.  No doubt the decline is due partially to the entrance of new small firms 
owned by individuals, since the registries do not include such entities.  Our analysis 
includes cases of entry and exit, probably due in most cases to reorganization rather 
than genuine startup or shutdown.
15   
The worker flow and worker flow relationships with job flows analysis is 
based on a survey of 530 industrial firms, selected through national probability 
sampling in 32 Russian oblasts, with a probability proportional to employment size.  
The data permit us to estimate annual rates of both job flows and worker flows for a 
consistent set of firms for the period 1990-1999 and to relate these flows to detailed 
information on firm characteristics. 
A 2001 survey of 297 new small enterprises in Romania is used to investigate 
the determinants of employment growth in the new private sector.  The data contain 
detailed measures of loans, tax breaks, technical assistance, managerial and employee 
human capital, and the business environment, as well as employment in 1992-2001. 
Russian registry data for 1985-2001, Ukrainian registry data for 1989 and 
1992-2002, Hungarian registry data for 1986-2001, Romanian registry data for 1992-
2002 are used in the studies of privatization’s effects on productivity and workers.  In 
                                                 
15 The size and ownership selection criteria for the registry imply that observed entrants are more likely 
to represent reorganizations of existing assets than startups from scratch.   18
all countries, the data contain over 90 percent of employment of the old firm 
manufacturing sector in 1992.    
For a more detailed description of the job flows and job flow productivity 
data, see Brown and Earle (2004).  Biletsky et al. (2002) contains more information 
on the data for worker and job flows.  Brown, Earle, and Lup (2004) gives details 
about the Romanian new small firm survey.  See Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a, 
2004b) for further information about the privatization data. 
II.3.1 Job and Worker Flows and Firm Turnover 
The first results are the basic job flow rates for the Russian and Ukrainian 
manufacturing sectors in Figure 1.  The job creation rate is negligible in Russian 
manufacturing during the Soviet period, but by the late 1990s both the Russian and 
Ukrainian rates are well within the range of creation rates of the full manufacturing 
sectors in the U.S. and other market economies. 
The calculated job destruction is also very low in the Soviet period, but the 
rate rises rapidly in the early reform period, quickly reaching the upper end of the 
typical range of rates found in the U.S.  The Russian and Ukrainian creation and 
destruction rates show very similar patterns, the main difference being that Ukrainian 
destruction did not rise as quickly as Russian destruction at the beginning of the 
reform period.  These results suggest that labor market flexibility increased 
substantially in response to market reforms. 
Brown and Earle (2002) measure the persistence of these employment changes 
among continuing firms, i.e., the extent to which jobs added or subtracted from the 
firm remain gained or lost in future years.  Results are displayed in Table 1.   
Persistence rates are calculated for one- and two-year periods, and both have fallen 
slightly during the reform period by comparison with Soviet socialism.  Apparently, 
the planners had little tendency to reverse their decisions on changing employment 
levels!  As in other countries, the persistence rate is lower for job creation than for job 
destruction, but for the latter it is quite high by international standards.  Thus, while 
creation persistence falls substantially during the transition, the measured flows do not 
appear to be the result of highly volatile behavior or noise in the data.  They are not 
primarily temporary phenomena, but rather appear to be signs of longer-term 
restructuring.   19
Job destruction rises much more quickly than job creation in both countries, 
resulting in substantial outflows from the manufacturing sector into other economic 
sectors, unemployment, and inactivity.  Creation catches up to destruction only after 
the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  The correlation between creation and destruction 
rates in Soviet Russia (1985-91) is 4.6 percent.  The Russian correlation in 1991-2001 
is –58.9 percent, and in Ukraine in 1993-98 it is even more negative at –95.4 percent.  
The transition experience is more similar to that in U.S. and Canadian manufacturing.  
Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) report the correlation to be –29.1 percent in 
Canada and –67.6  percent in the U.S. 
Since both creation and destruction have risen substantially during the 
transition, that means that excess job reallocation has also risen.  Brown and Earle 
(2002) calculate the percentage of the excess job reallocation that occurs between as 
opposed to within narrow industries, and these results appear in Table 2.  Similar to 
Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1999) results for the U.S., the results imply that most excess 
job reallocation occurs within rather than between narrow industries.  The average 
levels for the early reform period of 1992–1996 are greater than any of the estimates 
for comparable sets of industries in the country studies reported in Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999, Table 5).  This finding suggests that inter-industry flows may be 
relatively large in the reallocation process of the early transition.  Nonetheless, the 
intra-industry flows still dominate, and they become even more important in the late 
1990s, moving in the direction of market economies. 
Entry and exit account for 19 and 15 percent of job creation and destruction, 
respectively, in Soviet Russia (1985-92).  This translates to a contribution of 0.52 and 
1.65 percentage points to the creation and destruction rates.   This increases to 33 
(1.16 percentage points) and 32 (5.66) percent in 1993-96 and 39 (1.32) and 28 (4.48) 
percent in 1996-98.  Ukraine’s entry and exit contribute 53 (1.80) and 15 (2.01) 
percent of creation and destruction in the early reform period and 54 (2.08) and 24 
(3.52) percent in the late reform period.   
So entry and particularly exit have generated much higher job flows than 
during the Soviet period.  Ukrainian entry contributes relatively more to creation and 
less to destruction than is the case in transition Russia. The corresponding figures in 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the U.S. are 20 (1.84) percent for creation and 25 
(2.84) percent for destruction, so Russia and Ukraine’s proportions of job flows 
accounted for by firm turnover during the transition tend to be higher than in the U.S.    20
The percentage point contribution made by entry is actually lower in Russia and about 
the same in the Ukraine as in the U.S., while the percentage point contributions made 
by exit are higher than in the U.S.   
Russian accession and separation rates from Brown and Earle (2003) are 
displayed in Figure 2.  Worker flows are considerable during the Soviet period, and 
total worker flows rise further during the transition.  Somewhat surprisingly, hiring 
has continued at a high rate despite the downsizing.  Separations have risen more than 
hiring has fallen, suggesting that firms have adjusted employment more through 
increased separations than hiring freezes.  It also means that total worker flows have 
been higher than they would have if the hiring rate had been the main adjustment tool. 
Figure 3 shows the relationships between job and worker flows.  During the 
late Soviet period, job flows made up a small proportion of worker flows.  This 
continued to be the case for job creation until the economic recovery began in 1999.  
Job destruction, however, became a quite high proportion of separations, causing total 
job reallocation to be a larger fraction of worker flows.  The job destruction fraction 
of separations approaches the levels found in Western countries (see Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999), while the job creation fraction of accessions remains less than 
half Western levels throughout the period.  Nevertheless, the rise in the absolute level 
and the relative importance of job flows do suggest increased dynamism of Russian 
labor markets compared to their behavior under socialism. 
An important set of questions concerns the determinants of job and worker 
flows.  Table 3 summarizes the main results from Brown and Earle (2002, 2003) for 
Russia and Ukraine.  Product market competition is associated with more excess job 
reallocation, especially when adjustment costs are low.  Thus, more changes in market 
shares are occurring in competitive industries.  Churning is also higher in such 
sectors, particularly when adjustment costs are low.  This may be because of the 
larger number of alternative job opportunities for workers in competitive sectors.  The 
higher churning could also be due to greater pressure to restructure the workforce. 
Firms are slower to reduce employment when the labor market is dominated 
by a few employers.  In Russia excess job reallocation is lower in such markets.  This 
lack of labor market flexibility could be a symptom of extra political pressure to avoid 
unemployment in these regions.  Surprisingly, workers are just as likely to quit in 
concentrated labor markets as in more dispersed ones, despite having fewer outside 
options.   21
There is no evidence that unions are hindering employment reductions.   
Excess job reallocation is lower, with the greatest effect when adjustment costs are 
high. Hence unionized firms tend to be less flexible on average, but the difference is 
not so great except when the cost of being flexible is high.  Workers quit at a much 
lower rate in more unionized firms.  This could reflect union interference with the 
firm’s attempts to change personnel (e.g., to obtain a different skill mix).   
Alternatively, the union may give workers more opportunities to influence firm 
policies, leading to a stronger feeling of attachment. 
New firms show much greater dynamism than old firms, as all the components 
of job flows are higher.
16  Their employment growth is also much higher, but this may 
be overstated because the rates do not take exit into account, and new firms are likely 
to have a greater propensity to exit.  Unexpectedly, the churning rate is no higher than 
for old firms. 
Reorganized firms show more flexibility and churning than unreorganized old 
firms, the latter particularly when adjustment costs are low.  Such firms may need to 
change their skill mix as a result of the reorganization. 
As is the case in market economies, smaller firms create and destroy jobs at a 
higher rate and produce more excess job reallocation.  Unlike in the U.S. (see Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1999)), employment growth is higher in small firms, but again this 
could be because exit is not taken into account (small firms exit at a higher rate).  The 
higher flexibility in small firms can be explained by the fact that large firms incur 
higher adjustment costs.
17  Strangely, churning rates do not vary by firm size, contrary 
to expectations that large firms would exert more effort to retain workers they want to 
keep. 
II.3.2  Job Creation in New Private Firms 
Although the development of a new private sector is generally considered 
crucial to economic transition and development, there has been rather little empirical 
research on the determinants of startup firm growth.  In a recent study of small private 
firms in Romania, Brown, Earle, and Lup (2004) find that finance is an important 
determinant of employment growth.  Some results are shown in Table 4.  Loans, 
reinvested profit, trade credit, and tax breaks (which leave more profit for 
                                                 
16 This is similar to Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1999) results for the U.S. 
17 See Brown and Earle (2003).    22
reinvestment) are all associated with higher employment growth.
18  Despite using a 
large number of different measures, they are unable to detect any effect of the 
business environment in their sample.  Technical assistance and entrepreneurial and 
worker human capital do not appear to matter either. 
Some constraints on growth are difficult to quantify. Thus, Brown, Earle, and 
Lup (2004) also report managerial opinions on the extent to which various factors 
constrain their growth.  Managers most commonly report the level and administrative 
burden of taxation to be very constraining on their firm’s growth. Inflation and 
insufficient finance are also reported as severe constraints by most managers.   
Difficulties with obtaining inputs, low product demand, and business environment 
factors other than administrative burden of taxation are considered very constraining 
by less than half of managers.  So whether one uses quantitative or qualitative 
information, insufficient finance and a high burden of taxation appear to be 
particularly important constraints on growth for new start-ups.  
II.3.3  Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth 
Job reallocation did not contribute to productivity growth in Soviet Russia, as 
shown in Figure 4.
19  This changed dramatically after market reforms, as job 
reallocation contributed 3-4 percentage points to annual aggregate manufacturing 
labor productivity growth soon after market reforms were introduced.  The 
contribution of job reallocation to productivity growth is of a similar magnitude in 
Ukraine, though the positive effect did not begin to appear until two years after it 
appeared in Russia, perhaps a symptom of a more gradual reform strategy. 
Most of the contribution of reallocation to productivity growth has come 
through gains in market share of more productive continuing firms at the expense of 
less productive continuing firms.  Exit has also made an important contribution to 
productivity growth, as exiting firms have been less productive than survivors on 
average.   
                                                 
18 Table 4 shows the basic specification.  In alternative specifications shown in Brown, Earle, and Lup 
(2004), reinvested profits, trade credit, and numerous measures of the business environment are 
included. 
19 Figure 4 shows the overall effect of job reallocation on labor productivity growth, based on 
calculations from Brown and Earle (2004). Half the cross term in the productivity growth 
decomposition is allocated to the reallocation effect, as is the case in Griliches and Regev’s (1995) 
decomposition.  The effects on multifactor productivity growth are similar.   23
In stark contrast to the other reallocation components, entry has had a negative 
effect on labor productivity growth in the year of entry in both Russia and Ukraine.  
As shown in Figure 5, entrants have much lower labor productivity than surviving 
incumbents in the year of entry.  The medium-run contribution of entrants is zero or 
positive, however.  The less productive entrants tend to exit soon after entry, and 
productivity growth among surviving entrants is higher than that of surviving 
incumbents: by three years after entry, surviving entrant productivity is at least as 
high as that of surviving incumbents.  Thus both selection and learning effects are at 
work here.  These are similar patterns to those found by Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan (2001) for the U.S.  
The above picture is not one of sclerosis.  Market reforms have made 
reallocation quite productive, despite the continued presence of soft budget 
constraints, credit and labor market imperfections, and weak property rights and 
corporate governance.   
II.3.4 Privatization, Productivity, Employment, and Wages 
Privatization has had very different effects on firm-level productivity across 
countries.  As shown in Table 5, it has increased multifactor productivity substantially 
in Romania and Hungary, while the effect has been weaker or insignificant in Ukraine 
and insignificant or negative in Russia.  Djankov and Murrell (2002) come to a 
similar conclusion after reviewing dozens of studies: the privatization effect has been 
quite positive in Eastern Europe, but insignificant or negative in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). 
One possible factor contributing to the difference in the effect across countries 
is that Eastern European countries have placed fewer restrictions on and sometimes 
actively encouraged foreign participation in privatization.  The investment climate in 
Eastern Europe is also more appealing.  Thus, the share of foreign majority-owned 
privatized firms is much higher in Eastern Europe.  As of 2002, 22 percent of 
Hungary’s and six percent of Romania’s privatized manufacturing firms are majority 
owned by foreign investors, while only one percent of Russia and Ukraine’s are.   
Table 6 shows that the productivity effects from foreign-majority 
privatizations have been much stronger in all four countries.
20  The foreign 
privatization effect is strikingly similar across countries, in contrast to the domestic 
                                                 
20 This is also Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) conclusion.   24
privatization effect.  These results suggest that foreigners’ advantages in accessing 
finance, new technologies, the latest managerial techniques, and world markets far 
outweigh any disadvantages due to unfamiliarity with local conditions and weak 
political connections. 
Though having as high a percentage of foreign ownership as Hungary would 
make Russia and Ukraine’s overall privatization effects positive, this only partly 
explains the gap.  Another difference across countries that could matter is the fact that 
the privatization methods used in Hungary and Romania resulted in concentrated 
ownership from the time of privatization, whereas Russia and Ukraine’s mass 
privatization led to dispersed ownership by employees and small outside investors.
21  
Secondary trading has resulted in more concentrated ownership in Russia and 
Ukraine, but this has taken time.  This raises the possibility that if ownership 
concentration is a necessary condition for privatization to have a positive effect, then 
the effect may have appeared sooner in Hungary and Romania than in Russia and 
Ukraine.  As illustrated in Figure 6, the timing of the foreign privatization effect is 
quite similar across countries, with the main difference being that it was positive from 
the year of privatization in Hungary and Romania, while it doesn’t become positive 
until a year after privatization in Russia and Ukraine. 
  The timing of the domestic privatization effect varies considerably, however.  
Figure 7 shows that Romania and especially Hungary enjoy a strong positive effect 
already in the year of privatization, while Ukraine has a smaller positive effect a year 
later.  Russia actually experiences a decline before the effect turns positive five years 
after privatization.  This pattern is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that ownership 
concentration is an important precondition for productivity gains.
22 
To investigate this hypothesis further, we use the fact that some privatization 
methods led to more concentrated ownership than others, and that privatization 
methods changed across time in each country.  Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a) 
estimate the privatization effect separately for each privatization year cohort.  The 
differences across cohorts are insignificant in each country, so the in-country variation 
                                                 
21 Romania used management-employee buyouts early in the privatization process, but employees 
voted as a group, unlike in Russia and Ukraine. 
22 Studies reviewed by Djankov and Murrell (2002) show that the privatization effect is stronger when 
ownership is concentrated.  Lizal and Svejnar (2002) find, however, that the domestic privatization 
effect in the Czech Republic is weak or insignificant, even though ownership is concentrated.  Many of 
the domestic firms were controlled by investment privatization funds run by majority state-owned 
banks.  So the identity of the owner appears to matter as well.    25
in privatization method does not seem to matter. So for example, both manager-
employee buyouts (leading to dispersed ownership) and cash sales (leading to 
concentrated ownership) in Hungary and Romania have been successful. 
The privatization effect could be stronger in a better business environment.  
Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a) estimate the privatization effect in each year.  If 
the institutional environment is an important factor, one should see an increasingly 
positive privatization effect over time.  A pattern emerges only in Russia, where the 
effect is increasingly negative until 1998.  It becomes positive in 1999, coinciding 
with the economic recovery.   
The time pattern of the Russian results could be consistent with the hypothesis 
that privatization works best in good macroeconomic conditions.  Indeed, Brown, 
Earle, and Telegdy (2004a) find that the privatization effect is much stronger in 
Russian firms in expanding industries.  When controlling for expanding vs. 
contracting industries, the time pattern of the Russian privatization effect vanishes.  It 
thus appears that good macroeconomic conditions are an important precondition for 
successful privatization in Russia.  These results do not provide support for the 
hypothesis that the institutional environment is an important factor.
23 
Though privatization has had little effect on firm productivity in Russia, 
Brown and Earle (2004) find that it has a substantial effect on the productivity of job 
reallocation.  Private owners appear to be better at defensive restructuring than the 
state, adding resources when the firm is strong relative to its competitors, and cutting 
their losses when the firm has been a poor competitor.  Private owners also make 
better exit decisions in both Russia and Ukraine: the relationship between exit and 
productivity is more negative among privatized firms. 
 Privatization has also had significant effects on workers.  Table 6 shows that 
foreign privatization has increased employment in all four countries and wages in 
three, though the effects are not always significant.  Domestic privatization has been 
less kind to workers, however, as wages suffer in three countries, and employment 
rises only in Romania.   
                                                 
23 The result that the Romanian privatization effect is stronger than Hungary’s is also inconsistent with 
the institutional environment being an important factor, since Hungary’s institutional environment is 
considered to be much better than Romania’s.   26
Domestically privatized Russian firms appear to have delayed restructuring.  
They destroyed fewer jobs in the first two years after privatization.
24  Then 
restructuring began in earnest: they destroyed more jobs in years three through six.  
They did not create any more jobs than state firms until five years after privatization, 
about the time when their productivity started to rise relative to state firms.  The wage 
effect closely mirrors the productivity effect, initially quite negative, then becoming 
positive five years after privatization.  The employment composition and relative 
wages change slightly in favor of white-collar workers. 
When breaking Russian domestic ownership down by type, we find that 
worker and dispersed outsider ownership is associated with less job creation, but the 
effects on the other job flow components are insignificant.  Contrary to expectations, 
concentrated outsider ownership is not associated with higher job flows. 
Foreign-privatization in Russia has led to relatively higher employment three 
years after privatization, while it has a sharply negative effect on wages in years two 
to four.  Employment composition and relative wage changes in foreign-privatized 
firms have been significantly biased toward white-collar employees.  This is 
consistent with skill-biased technical change.  It also suggests that foreign 
privatization has increased inequality. 
Figure 8 shows little effect of Ukrainian foreign privatization on the 
employment level until five years after privatization, while a positive effect on wages 
appears beginning three years after privatization.  Domestic privatization has had a 
positive effect on job creation starting in the first year after privatization.  The effect 
on destruction is just the opposite of that for Russian domestic privatization: it is 
positive in the first year, then increasingly negative.  This would seem to suggest that 
Ukrainian domestically privatized firms began restructuring sooner than Russian 
domestically privatized firms.  As shown in Figures 10 and 11, there is a weak 
positive effect on the employment level several years after privatization, while the 
effect on the wage level is negative. 
Foreign privatization has an immediate and sustained positive effect on 
employment in Romania.  It has a positive effect on wages as well, though this does 
not appear until two years after privatization.  The effect of domestic privatization on 
                                                 
24 The job creation, destruction, and employment growth results for Russian and Ukrainian domestic 
privatization come from regressions using the same samples as those employed in Brown, Earle, and 
Telegdy (2004b).   27
employment is similarly positive and sustained, but it increasingly depresses wages, 
suggesting an employment-wage trade-off.  Domestic privatization has also increased 
job creation. 
The Hungarian foreign privatization effects are very similar to those found in 
Romania: we find a strong, sustained positive effect on employment and a slower-to-
appear positive effect on wages.  Domestic privatization has had a smaller positive 
effect on employment, and a similarly sustained negative effect on wages in 
comparison to Romania.  Job creation is higher in domestically privatized firms.  
Putting these results together, the productivity gains from foreign privatization 
have not generally come at workers’ expense, except for wages in Russia.  Workers 
have fared less well in domestic privatizations. The employment effects have been 
neutral or positive, but wages have declined year-by-year. Domestic privatization has 
thus been less proficient at creating productive jobs.  
Privatization has had an effect on the functioning of the labor market in 
general.  As reported in Table 7, privatization has increased labor market flexibility, 
raising excess job reallocation in both Russia and Ukraine.   
Brown and Earle (2003) find no effect of privatization on worker churning 
overall, though privatized firms experience less when adjustment costs are high.   
Firms with a higher foreign blockholder share experience less churning, but this is 
particularly true when adjustment costs are low.  Perhaps lower skilled workers are 
reluctant to voluntarily leave good jobs in foreign firms.     
III. CONCLUSION 
“Labor market flexibility” and “job creation” have been the twin slogans of 
policymakers facing the challenges of falling employment and high unemployment in 
the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  But 
flexibility too frequently remains a theoretical concept, with relatively few 
measurements of its magnitude and estimates of how policies affect it.  And, as even a 
glance at the employment situation under central planning makes plain better than any 
abstract arguments, increasing employment without concern for the productivity of 
the jobs created may be a misplaced effort.   28
Motivated by these premises, the paper has analyzed the magnitude and 
characteristics of employment growth within firms, the reallocation of employment 
across firms, and the relationship of the patterns to productivity growth.   
Market reform has led to a sizeable increase in the pace of job reallocation.  
The nature of the reallocation suggests that significant restructuring has taken place, 
as a higher proportion of it is between sectors than in OECD countries, and job 
reallocation has made up an increasing proportion of overall worker turnover.  Unlike 
under central planning, the reallocation has made an important contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth. 
A principal concern of the paper has been the effects of measurable market 
reforms on reallocation and the creation of productive jobs.  Product market 
competition has increased the amount of reallocation occurring among firms within 
the same sectors, as well as raising worker churning (replaced separations).   
Competition among firms in the labor market has facilitated firm downsizing.  New 
and small firms have been particularly active job creators and destroyers, while firm 
reorganizations are associated with high churning. 
Privatization has increased labor market flexibility and made reallocation 
more productive. Privatized firms with domestic owners have created more jobs in 
Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine and destroyed more in Russia. Concentrated outside 
ownership has not led to higher job or worker flows. Firms with foreign blockholders 
actually experienced less job reallocation and worker churning, however.  
Not only has privatization increased job reallocation among firms within the 
same narrow sectors, but privatized firms’ reallocation has been more productive than 
that of state firms: privatized firms’ employment change decisions have been more 
strongly related to their relative productivity within their sector. 
Firm productivity has usually improved as a result of privatization, but the 
magnitude and timing of the effect has varied considerably across countries and types 
of privatization.  Privatization to foreign owners has consistently led to large 
productivity increases within a year after privatization.  The effects of domestic 
privatization have varied considerably across countries, however.  In Romania and 
Hungary, strong positive effects already appeared in the year of privatization, whereas 
the effect was negative until five years after privatization in Russia.  The effect was 
also weak in Ukraine.  We find little support for a number of plausible hypotheses for 
why the privatization effect might differ across countries.   29
The available evidence is mixed on whether the productivity gains from 
privatization have come at the expense of workers.  Foreign privatizations, which 
were most productive on average, have generally had a positive effect on employment 
and wages.  Domestic privatizations, however, have had a negative effect on wages, 
even in Hungary and Romania where post-privatization productivity gains were 
substantial.  Privatization has also increased inequality.  White-collar workers have 
benefited more from privatization than blue-collar workers, both in terms of 
employment and wages, especially in foreign-owned firms. 
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Table 1 
Average Annual Job Flow Persistence Rates (%) 
 
 Creation  Persistence    Destruction  Persistence 
 1-Year  2-Year    1-Year  2-Year 
Soviet Russia  75.2  57.1  94.3  91.7 
        
Reform Russia  66.6  50.9  96.4  94.2 
        
Reform Ukraine  71.6  55.7  97.1  95.6* 
Note:  The Soviet 1-year and 2-year persistence rates are calculated for creation and 
destruction occurring between 1985–1992.  The reform period 1-year persistence is 
calculated for job flows between 1992–1999 and the 2-year persistence is for 1992–
1998. Job flows by entering and exiting firms are excluded here.  The star (*) 
signifies that the Reform Ukraine rate is statistically significantly different from the 
Reform Russia rate at the one percent level.  These results are from Brown and Earle 
(2002). 
   
Table 2 
Percentage of Excess Job Flows Between Five-Digit Industries 
 
 Russia  Ukraine 
Soviet (1985-92)  28.3  N.A. 
Early Reform (1992-96)  25.2  40.0 
Late Reform (1996-2000)  19.3  23.8 
Note:  These figures reflect average annual calculations of the decomposition of XJR 
into between- and within-industry components for each of the five country-periods. 
“N.A.” indicates not available. Job flows by entering and exiting firms are excluded here. 
These results are from Brown and Earle (2002). 
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Table 3 
Effects of Firm Characteristics on Job and Worker Flows 
 








Product Market Competition  0r1, 0r2, 0u 0 r1, 0r2, ─u 0 r1, 0r2, ─u + r1, ─r2, 0u 0 r1, 0r2, +u + r2 
Labor Market Competition  0r1, 0r2, 0u + r1, 0r2, +u + r1, 0r2, +u + r1, 0r2, 0u  ─r1, 0r2, ─u 0 r2 
Unionization 0r2 0 r2 0 r2  ─r2 0 r2  ─r2 
New Firm  +r2 + r2 + r2 + r2 + r2 0 r2 
Reorganized Firm  0r2 0 r2 0 r2 + r2 0 r2 + r2 
Firm Size  ─r1, 0r2, ─u  ─r1, 0r2, ─u  ─r1, 0r2, ─u  ─r1, ─r2, ─u + r1, 0r2, +u 0 r2 
Note: The subscripts r1, r2, and u refer to the Russian registry, Russian survey, and Ukrainian registry, respectively.  The excess job reallocation 
results from the Russian and Ukrainian registries come from Brown and Earle (2002), and the remainder of the registry results are calculations 
done here using the same sample.  The job reallocation, excess job reallocation, employment growth, and churning results from the Russian 
survey come from Brown and Earle (2003). The Russian survey job creation and job destruction results are calculations done here using the 
same sample. The +’s and ─’s are significant at the 5 percent level, with the exception of excess job reallocation, for which we are unable to 
calculate a significance level. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Employment Growth  
in Small Startup Firms in Romania 
 
Employment Growth   
OLS Fixed  Effects 
Financial:    








Entrepreneurs’ Characteristics:    













 Education:    
















Workers’ Education:    
 High  School  0.000 
(1.47)   
 University  -0.000 
(-0.33)   




N  1031 
R
2  0.100 0.185 
Note: Results from Brown, Earle, and Lup (2004).  T statistics based on firm-clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Though not reported here, the fixed effects 
regressions include the firm’s age, dummies for acquisitions and spin-offs, two size-
category dummies, year dummies, and employment growth in the firm’s industry 
country.  Besides these variables, the OLS regressions also include the population of the 








Estimated Effects of Privatization on Multifactor Productivity 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 










   0.649 0.693 0.707 0.600 
N 21,977  21,461  213,447  57,600 
Note:  These results come from Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a).  They are Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimations.  Ln capital (k) and labor (l) are interacted with ten industry dummies; average coefficients 
are shown.  Firm fixed effects and full sets of unrestricted industry-year dummies are also included.  Private = 1 
if the firm is majority private at end of year t-1.  Ever Private = 1 if the firm is private in any year.  Standard 
errors (corrected for clustering) shown in parentheses.  ** = significant at 1-percent level. 




Estimated Effects of Foreign and Domestic Privatization 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
MFP    
















N 21,976  21,461  213,447  56,892 
EMP       
















N 22,781  23,350  230,545  62,339 
WAGE       
















N 21,798  20,107  169,478  56,102 
Note:  These results come from Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2004a, 2004b).  Foreign = 1 if the majority of the 
firm's shares are owned by foreigners in year t-1.  Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t-1 but not 
majority-owned by foreigners.  Otherwise, the definitions are the same as in Table 5.  Standard errors 
(corrected for clustering) shown in parentheses.  ** = significant at 1-percent level, and * = significant at 5-
percent level. 
   39
Table 7 
Effects of Ownership on Job and Worker Flows 
 








Domestic Private Dummy  +h, +r, 0r1, +u 0 h, 0r, +r1, 0u 0 h, 0r, +r1, 0u  + h, +r, ─r1, 0u  
Foreign Private Dummy  0h, 0r, 0r1, 0u 0 h, 0r, ─r1, 0u 0 h, 0r, ─r1, 0u  0 h, 0r, +r1, 0u  
Private  Dummy      +r1, +u    
Private Share  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2 
Worker Share  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2 
Manager Share  0r2 0 r2 0 r2 + r2 0 r2 + r2 
Dispersed Outsider Share  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2  ─r2 0 r2 + r2 
Domestic Blockholder Share  0r2 0 r2 0 r2  ─r2 0 r2 0 r2 
Foreign Blockholder Share  0r2 0 r2  ─r2  ─r2 0 r2  ─r2 
Note: The subscripts h, r, r1, r2, and u refer to the Hungarian registry, Romanian registry, Russian registry, Russian survey, and Ukrainian 
registry respectively.  The excess job reallocation results from the Russian and Ukrainian registries come from Brown and Earle (2002), and the 
remainder of the registry results are calculations done here using the same sample.  The job reallocation, excess job reallocation, employment 
growth, and churning results from the Russian survey come from Brown and Earle (2003). The Russian survey job creation and job destruction 
results are calculations done here using the same sample.  The +’s and ─’s are significant at the 5 percent level, with the exception of excess job 
reallocation, for which we are unable to calculate a significance level. 
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Figure 4
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Figure 7
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